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CONVICTION BEYOND A REASONABLE SUSPICION? THE NEED 
FOR STRENGTHENING THE FACTUAL BASIS REQUIREMENT IN 
GUILTY PLEAS 
Myeonki Kim* 
Does the court, before accepting a guilty plea, check the accuracy of 
the plea agreement in any significant way? This article addresses the issues 
on judges being unconcerned or the inconsistent practice of guiding the 
stages of guilty plea. The article further suggests that the judge should 
carefully review its factual basis to avoid a wrongful guilty plea. Although 
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure requires the judges to 
check the factual basis of the guilty plea, the rule is not paid much attention 
to legal professionals. Setting the adversarial culture aside, the rule itself has 
a structural problem not to be enforced properly during a plea colloquy. 
Instead of revising the rule, this article proposes a newer interpretation to 
induce judges more responsible to confirm the factual basis. This could be a 
practical solution 1) to filter out an inaccurate pleading guilty, 2) to increase 
the accountability of the prosecution in guilty plea, and 3) to help the 
defendant make more informed plea decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The dominance of plea bargaining is apparent in the American 
criminal justice system.1 Most cases are disposed of by guilty pleas, and trials 
are rarely held. Although plea bargaining has existed for a long time, there 
has been a rapid increase of guilty-plea cases recently.2 As jury trials have 
become increasingly complex and time-consuming in the twentieth century, 
the prosecution and the defense have shown more preference towards 
expeditious, predictable plea bargaining.3 Harsh sentencing rubrics, which 
arose from “tough on crime” policies, also facilitated this movement.4 Even 
though there are conflicting views as to how to see and recognize the plea-
bargaining process, plea bargaining is generally regarded as an essential 
element to reduce crowded dockets.5 
If plea bargaining contributes to the search for truth or administering 
justice, the high ratio itself is not a problem. However, there is a growing 
disbelief in the accuracy of guilty pleas.6 Although many assume a defendant 
to be an informed decision-maker in a guilty plea,7 the credibility of guilty 
pleas is becoming questionable. 8  In fact, numerous exonerations have 
revealed that a large number of people are pleading guilty to crimes they did 
not commit.9 In response to these growing concerns, the Supreme Court of 
the United States has begun addressing more cases involving plea 
bargaining. 10  Although many scholars have also proposed a variety of 
reforms in diverse aspects, the impact has been minimal.11  Additionally, 
                                                 
1 See Part II.A. 
2 See John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 261, 261-70 (1979). 
3 See Part II.A. 
4 See Part IV.C. 
5 See Part IV.B. 
6 See Part II.B. 
7 Stephanos Bibas, The Myth of the Fully Informed Rational Actor, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 79, 80 (2011). 
8  See Part II.B. 
9  See Part II.B. 
10 See Part II.A. 
11 See Part II.C. 
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resources for the defense, which are essential to a guilty-plea process, are still 
insufficient. 
This Article argues that judges should carefully check the factual 
basis of guilty pleas during plea hearings through a reinterpretation of 
existing rules.12 More than a half-century ago, the Supreme Court obligated 
judges to confirm the factual basis of a plea agreement before accepting it.13 
Nevertheless, most judges tend to focus on confirming whether defendants 
are voluntarily pleading guilty and waiving their constitutional rights, rather 
than confirming the factual basis of the guilty plea. Moreover, there is no 
clear agreement among judges on the definition of “factual basis.”14 The 
current system does not work properly because there are structural problems 
in the composition of the relevant rule in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (FRCP).15 If judges more actively interpreted the rules requiring 
confirmation, they would be obliged to establish a certain degree of guilt 
before accepting a guilty plea. Judges are in the best position to reform the 
problematic status quo of the plea-bargaining process, benefiting both the 
prosecutor and the accused.16 
Given the central role of guilty pleas in the criminal justice system, 
the potential resistance to any reform of the plea-bargaining process must be 
considered carefully. 17  Judicial inertia, which is deeply rooted in the 
American adversarial system, will likely pose the greatest resistance to this 
argument.18 It might be difficult for trial judges, who are already used to 
taking on neutral and passive roles, to actively intervene in an agreed-upon 
guilty plea. However, this Article contends that, currently, judges do not even 
play a minimum role as a neutral arbiter. It should be noted that it is the duty 
of the judge to find a factual basis before accepting a guilty plea. This Article 
will also refute other concerns regarding the enhanced judicial review for the 
                                                 
12 See Part III.B. 
13 See Part III.A. 
14 See Part III.A. 
15 See Part III.B. 
16 See Part III.C. 
17 See Part IV. Because plea bargaining is almost inevitable in disposing criminal cases, small 
changes can cause great impact, and ultimately strong resistance. Therefore, this paper 
addresses possible resistance in Part IV. 
18 See Part IV.A. 
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factual basis requirement, such as insufficient resources19 and detriment to 
defendants.20 
Part II analyzes the American plea-bargaining system, particularly 
focusing on its questionable practice and the limits of existing suggestions. 
Part III argues that the factual basis requirement in Rule 11(e) of the FRCP 
should be reinvigorated. Although this provision has been rather unnoticed, 
this Article suggests that its reinterpretation would instill a greater sense of 
responsibility in judges to find factual basis. Part IV refutes anticipated 
objections, because even a slight change in the plea-bargaining practice will 
bring a considerable change in the criminal justice system. 
I. THE QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE OF PLEA BARGAINING: BY-PRODUCT OF 
ADVERSARIAL EXCESSES 
A.         The American Way of Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargaining now dominates the American criminal justice 
system.21 As Justice Kennedy pointed out, the American system “is for the 
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,”22 and plea bargaining “is 
not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice 
system.”23 It may be hard for judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel to 
imagine a criminal procedure without plea bargaining. Scholars have long 
been aware of this trend towards plea bargaining: most articles discussing 
plea-bargaining issues present evidence that most criminal cases are disposed 
                                                 
19 See Part IV.B. 
20 See Part IV.C. 
21 Of course, this did not happen all at once. Professor Wayne R. LaFave explains that many 
factors are comprehensibly contributable to plea bargaining’s current status. WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1195 (W. Acad. 6th ed. 2017). According to LaFave, 
these factors include an increased number of cases, the emergence of professional law 
enforcement agencies and defense counsel, cumbersome and expensive jury trials, the due 
process revolution, the harshness of criminal law, unpredictable sentencing practices, and 
the desire of prosecutors and judges to get convictions. Id. Put simply, the expansion of plea 
bargaining arose from three distinct factors: (1) administrative convenience, (2) 
modernization of the criminal justice system, and (3) severe punishments within the current 
system. Id.   
22 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). In another case on the same day, Kennedy 
also warned that “[t]he reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the 
administration of the criminal justice system . . . it is insufficient simply to point to the 
guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.” 
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012). 
23 Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as 
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
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of through guilty pleas.24 Students assigned to observe jury trials should be 
concerned about losing the increasingly rare opportunity to actually observe 
such a trial. Professor Marc Galanter’s well-known “vanishing trial” has 
already become commonplace in American criminal courts. 25 
Although plea bargaining is now widely used, surrounding 
controversies still persist. The issue that typically arises is related to 
understanding plea bargaining and addressing its existing problems 
accordingly. A majority of legal professionals view plea bargaining as no 
more than a contract.26 For them, it is merely a different type of adversarial 
process, in which parties bargain for a mutually agreed-upon outcome.27 One 
of the strong supporters of this assertion, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, argues 
that “[p]lea bargaining is a form of contract, and its regulation through the 
common-law process is fundamentally no different from the way courts treat 
other contracts.” 28  According to Judge Easterbrook, the lessons of 
commercial law apply equally to the plea-bargaining practice; thus, proposals 
to regulate plea bargaining would inevitably cause side effects.29 Therefore, 
he argues that the focus must be not on the system of plea bargaining, but on 
the defendants’ inherent disadvantage and how to correct it.30 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE 
L.J. 1179, 1206 (1975) (concerning the fact that Alschuler’s article was written over forty 
years ago, which indicates that the dominance of plea bargaining is not a recent event); 
Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional 
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
869, 871 (2009).  
25 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). 
26 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining is a Shadow Market, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 551 
(2013); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 23, at 1911–12. 
27 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 23, at 1935. 
28 See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 551. 
29 See id. at 551–52. In his article, Judge Easterbrook states that: 
[P]roposals to regulate plea bargaining have the same limitations and 
consequences as proposals to regulate commercial contracts. Ban it, and it 
continues but goes underground, as in many states before they gradually 
recognized its legitimacy during the 1960s and 1970s. Black markets 
predominate when lawful markets are forbidden—but black markets are 
characterized by less information, more fraud, and few guarantees of 
voluntary action. Far better to acknowledge the practice and get the terms 
in writing; contract law has a Statute of Frauds for very good reason. 
Id. 
30 See id. at 553–54. 
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Others present different views.31 They point out that the real practice 
of plea bargaining contains many non-adversarial features,32 such as Gerard 
E. Lynch’s Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice.33 Even if “plea 
bargaining grows out of an adversarial ideology,” it is “a system of justice 
that actually looks, to most defendants, far more like . . . an inquisitorial 
system” than an adversary model.34 The prosecutors’ role in plea bargaining 
is closer to an adjudicatory function, because their priority is to make accurate, 
appropriate decisions after reviewing evidence; negotiation is rather limited 
and subsidiary.35 
More than 50 years ago, Professor Herbert L. Packer made a similar 
claim through his famous Two Models of The Criminal Process.36 Professor 
Packer argued that plea bargaining is largely based on the Crime Control 
Model, which “places heavy reliance on the ability of investigative and 
prosecutorial officers, acting in an informal setting in which their distinctive 
skills are given full sway, to elicit and reconstruct a tolerably accurate account 
of . . . an alleged criminal event.”37 In contrast, he claimed that the Due 
Process Model, which rejects “informal fact[-]finding processes as definitive 
of factual guilt and [insists] on formal, adjudicative, adversary fact[-]finding 
processes . . . [before] an impartial tribunal,” rarely exists in the guilty-plea 
process.38 
These contrasting views explain why it took so long for the plea-
bargaining system to become a dominant feature of the American legal 
system. Although plea bargaining had already become a common practice in 
the United States during the mid-1800s,39 the practice of plea bargaining did 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1673 (2015); Barkow, supra note 24. 
32 See Barkow, supra note 24, at 871 (“In the current era dominated by pleas instead of trials, 
federal prosecutors are not merely law enforcers. They are the final adjudicators in the vast 
majority of cases.” (emphasis added)).  
33 Lynch, supra note 31. 
34 Lynch, supra note 31, at 1677. An inquisitorial system is “[a] system of proof-taking used 
in civil law, whereby the judge conducts the trial, determines what questions to ask, and  
defines the scope and the extent of the inquiry.” Inquisitorial System, BLACK’S LAW  
DICTIONARY 913 (10th ed. 2014). 
35 Lynch, supra note 31, at 1683. 
36 See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
37 Id. at 14. Packer goes on to say, “any general view of the guilty plea in this country at the  
present time would disclose practices that conform far more closely to the Crime Control  
than to the Due Process Model.” Id. 50–51. 
38 Id. at 14. 
39 John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants 
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not gain legitimacy in the legal community until long after that.40 It was not 
until 1967 that the American Bar Association noted the necessity of plea 
bargaining due to resource limitations and thereafter embraced the practice.41 
Then, in the 1970s, the Supreme Court first admitted the constitutionality of 
plea bargaining42 and officially acknowledged its several advantages, which 
the Court thought were essential to the modern criminal justice system.43 
However, even after this acknowledgment, the Court has remained 
reluctant to intervene in the plea-bargaining practice. For example, the Court 
initially refused to accept Ineffective Assistance of Counsel appeals (IAC), 
even though there was a lack of clarity about what constitutes IAC in plea 
bargaining.44 It was only a few years ago that Padilla v. Kentucky,45 Missouri 
v. Frye, 46  and Lafler v. Cooper 47  recognized IAC claims during plea 
negotiations.48 In Padilla, the Court required that immigration consequences 
of a conviction should be made known to a non-citizen defendant before 
                                                 
Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 162 (2014) (citing JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA 
BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 9 (Hiram E. Chodosh ed., 2009)). 
40 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (approving the constitutionality of  
plea bargaining); Blume & Helm, supra note 39 (“The constitutionality of the practice . . .  
was not firmly established until 1970.”). 
41 Blume & Helm, supra note 39 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON 
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 
2 (1967)). 
42 Brady, 397 U.S. at 753 (“[W]e cannot hold that [plea bargaining] is unconstitutional for 
the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the 
State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and 
to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in 
rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.”). 
43 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (“‘[P]lea bargaining[]’ is an 
essential component of the administration of justice . . . If every criminal charge were 
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply 
by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”). 
44 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 21, at 1231 (“There is greater uncertainty as to what 
[effective assistance of counsel] means in a guilty plea context as compared to a trial context 
. . . .”). 
45 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010) (holding that the defendant should hear the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
46 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (noting that a guilty plea is invalid because 
counsel “provided incorrect advice pertinent to the plea”). 
47 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 176 (2012) (ruling that a state habeas petitioner can argue 
ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel deficiently advises him to reject a 
favorable plea bargain, even though he is convicted in a fair trial). 
48 Thus, it seems that the Court is no longer reluctant to assess the plea-bargaining process 
under the IAC rubric. 
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entering a guilty plea. 49  Frye and Lafler mandated that counsel’s 
communication and advice during plea negotiation should be correct.50 “In 
order that benefits [of plea bargaining] can be realized,” the Court 
emphasized, “criminal defendants require effective counsel during plea 
negotiations.”51 
In those cases, the Court emphasized the predominant role of plea 
bargaining, which virtually replaced trial, and seemed to signal that this was 
the primary reason for justifying its decision to accept IAC claims. 52 
However, the criminal justice system had long been governed by plea 
bargaining.53 After plea bargaining gained constitutional legitimacy, the last 
several decades witnessed only a slight change in its proportion.54 The real 
reason for the slow shift of IAC jurisprudence may be the Court’s ongoing 
reluctance to “acknowledge either the existence or the legitimacy of plea 
negotiations.”55 The great controversy that would be expected to follow after 
any plea-bargaining decision could be another reason; both Frye and Lafler 
were 5–4 decisions.56 These long-delayed changes show the degree to which 
plea bargaining is a controversial and complicated area to regulate. 
The above discussion leads to two conclusions. First, plea bargaining 
is a sort of by-product inevitably derived from the cumbersome jury trial, 
which symbolizes the American legal system. Both sides, whether plea 
bargaining is viewed as adversarial or inquisitorial, admit the need for 
increased efficiency.57 Second, the area of plea bargaining has long been 
                                                 
49 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. 
50 Lafler, 566 U.S. at 168 (“If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to 
effective assistance of counsel . . . . If that right is denied, prejudice can be shown if loss of 
the plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in . . . the imposition of . . . more severe 
[consequences].”); Frye, 566 U.S. at 145 (“[D]efense counsel has the duty to communicate 
formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be 
favorable to the accused.”).  
51 Frye, 566 U.S. at 144. 
52 Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170; Frye, 566 U.S. at 143; Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372. 
53 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
54 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
55 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 21, at 1231. 
56 Lafler, 566 U.S. at 175–87 (noting that Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito joined 
in the dissent); Frye, 566 U.S. at 151 (noting that Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Roberts 
joined in the dissent).  
57 See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 552 (“Prosecutors have limited budgets and want to 
induce guilty pleas so that they can bring more cases, using the resources released when they 
don't have to take each defendant to trial.”); Lynch, supra note 31, at 1698 (“The existing 
system of prosecutorial administration has arisen because the traditional adversarial model 
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unregulated for whatever reasons. Some argue it is better not to artificially 
regulate plea bargaining like a contract; the Court has just avoided the 
discussion. Thus, although plea bargaining is regarded as “an essential 
component”58 in the American adversarial system, it is, ironically, by and 
large exempted from the type of formal adversary oversights on which the 
American system is generally based.59 
B.         Doubts Surrounding the “Accurate” Plea Bargaining Process 
The nature of plea bargaining itself, such as whether it implements 
adversarial or non-adversarial ideology, or whether it is tightly regulated, is 
not at issue in this Article. The question is whether its present practice helps 
the courts in their search for the truth or administration of justice. 
Ideally, only those who have committed crimes would plead guilty, 
and innocent people would walk free. For a period of time, the courts were 
convinced that the existing practice of plea bargaining was close to an ideal 
status. As the Court pointed out, if plea bargaining is “[p]roperly 
administered, it is to be encouraged” because it eliminates many negatives of 
a trial, such as time-consuming procedures. 60  However, contrary to the 
conventional belief that innocent people do not plead guilty, reliable data on 
wrongful convictions clearly reveals that innocent people sometimes do plead 
guilty.61  As of now, more than 380 reported exonerations have reversed 
convictions obtained by guilty pleas.62 
Determining how problematic the current plea-bargaining practice is 
presents a difficult task. Little is known about the real practice of plea 
bargaining: for instance, a psychological study that intended to measure the 
“accuracy of criminal process” failed to address the guilty-plea issue because 
                                                 
has become too ex-pensive, contentious, and inefficient to be restored, at least given present 
levels of criminal conduct and judicial resources.”). 
58 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
59 See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative  
View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 214 (2006) (“Our system has already slipped away from the 
adversarial model, and has become instead an ‘administrative system of criminal justice,’ 
managed by the prosecutor’s office rather than the courts.” (quoting Gerard E. Lynch, Our  
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998))). 
60 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260. 
61 See NAT’L REG. EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ 
detaillist.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) (follow “Browse Cases” drop down; then follow 
“Detailed View;” enter “Guilty Plea” into the “Filter” search bar)(reporting that there have 
been 380 exonerations in cases in which the conviction was obtained by a guilty plea). 
62 Id. 
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“it does not readily lend itself to psychological experimentation.” 63  The 
concern was that the “defendants’ decisions to plead guilty are [still] based 
on sparse, uncertain, and questionable evidence that will rarely be subjected 
to any meaningful scrutiny.”64 While plea bargaining gained constitutional 
legitimacy after Brady,65 it is still carried out as though it were on the black 
market. 66 Accordingly, whether the current plea-bargaining practice induces 
accurate outcomes is subject to a recurring controversy. 
Given that defendants’ guilty pleas are no longer highly reliable, it is 
worth reviewing how and why the plea-bargaining practice rarely concerns 
itself with accuracy. For a rough estimate of accuracy, there is one simple and 
intuitive factor to consider—the standard of proof. In a trial, the accuracy of 
a conviction is guaranteed through a high burden of proof, “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” which the prosecution is obligated to establish.67 However, 
in a guilty plea, there is no clear standard like this. One criticism is that “with 
mere probable cause, the prosecutor can secure a conviction in almost all 
cases.”68 After being charged only on the basis of probable cause, rational 
defendants are pressured to plead guilty to avoid trial penalty, even if the 
prosecutions’ cases are weak. 69  Thus, Professor Gregory M. Gilchrist 
indicates that, in guilty-plea cases, “the effective burden of proof for the 
prosecution can be reduced to mere probable cause.”70 If this is true, wrongful 
guilty pleas can lead to miscarriages of justice.71 
However, in real practice, guilty-plea cases can be disposed of by an 
even lower standard than probable cause. Most standards of proof used in 
investigation and prosecution tend to be perfunctory. 72  It is difficult to 
                                                 
63 DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 10–13 
(2012). 
64 Id. at 10. 
65 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (approving the constitutionality of plea 
bargaining).  
66 RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1206 (2d ed. 2005). 
67 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 




72 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 353 (1986) (discussing that police are not in a neutral 
position to enforce probable cause). 
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determine whether officers arrest a suspect based on “probable cause”73 or 
mere “reasonable suspicion.”74 The same might be true in a prosecutorial 
charging decision. 75  This is not because the standards themselves are 
ambiguous,76  but because they are not enforced by neutral and detached 
judicial officers; prosecutors are self-regulated. The first judicial stage in 
prosecution (and investigation) with any standard of proof is a preliminary 
hearing.77 Here, the judge decides whether there is enough evidence to force 
the defendant to stand trial based on a “probable cause” standard. However, 
for various reasons, defendants often waive the preliminary hearing right and 
proceed to trial.78 
Although defendants can subsequently file a motion to suppress 
evidence, some defendants find this option closed to them. Prosecutors 
sometimes make plea offers contingent on the defendants forgoing motions 
to suppress evidence. Thus, some defendants do not file a motion simply 
because it is too risky and may cost them their opportunity to plea bargain. 
Even in other situations, defense counsel often advise defendants that it is in 
their best interest to not provoke more tension amongst the court and 
prosecutor by waiving their right to raise issues. Putting these strategic 
reasons aside, defendants also face structural disadvantages; defendants are 
sometimes adversely situated because of the burden of proof for 
suppression,79 and hindsight and outcome bias may discourage judges from 
suppressing evidence after they see probative evidence that was obtained 
                                                 
73 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1395 (defining “probable cause” as “[a] 
reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a 
place contains specific items connected with a crime”). 
74 Id. at 1676 (defining “reasonable suspicion” as “[a] particularized and objective basis, 
supported by specific and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal activity”). 
75 This is because the role of prosecutors is inherently adversarial.  
76 See Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause, in THE POLITICAL 
HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THE THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 131, 132  
(Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012)  (“[The] courts should not quantify probable cause 
because quantification would lead to less accurate probable cause determinations.”). 
77 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1371 (defining “preliminary hearing” as “[a] 
criminal hearing (often conducted by a magistrate) to determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to prosecute an accused person”). 
78 Paul Bergman, When Does It Make Sense to Waive the Preliminary Hearing?, NOLO,  
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/when-does-sense-waive-the-preliminaryhearing 
.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) (presenting several reasons why a defendants would waive 
their right to a preliminary hearing). 
79 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 21, at 673. 
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illegally.80 In most criminal cases, any applied standard of proof for a guilty 
plea to be accepted is, at best, “probable cause” or possibly “reasonable 
suspicion.” 
While rather cursory, guilty pleas could be disposed of through such 
a low threshold. The spate of recent overturned wrongful convictions, arising 
from incorrect guilty pleas, have created a strong suspicion about the 
reliability of the current plea-bargaining system. This present condition 
requires increased attention to the practice of plea bargaining. Although plea 
bargaining “is the criminal justice system” 81  in America, more fair and 
accurate outcomes are ensured primarily through jury trials.82 As Professor 
Stephanos Bibas points out, “[w]e can no longer count on jury trials as 
backstops, ensuring that bargains are fair and accurate because bargains are 
struck in the shadow of the adversarial process.”83 More troubling is the fact 
that much is still unknown about the reality of the plea-bargaining practice 
and its effects.84 
Despite the growing doubts about the sufficiency of plea bargaining, 
the Court has not directly addressed this issue. Instead, as an indirect way to 
assure that plea bargains are based on actual guilt, the Court seems to focus 
on insufficient information given to defendants during plea negotiations. As 
noted, in Padilla, Frye, and Lafler, the Court held that certain types of 
information must be given to defendants before they enter guilty pleas and if 
such information is not given, IAC claims should be allowed.85 However, 
                                                 
80 For a brief explanation of hindsight and outcome bias, see Barbara O’Brien & Keith 
Findley, Psychological Perspectives: Cognition and Decision Making, in EXAMINING  
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 35, 37–38 (Allison D. 
Redlich et al. eds., 2014). 
81 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (quoting Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 
YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
82 STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 13 (2012). 
83 Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining from the Ground Up: Accuracy and Fairness 
Without Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1081 (2016). 
84 See supra note 59–62 and accompanying text.  
85 The Court explained that although defendants have no right to plea bargaining, “[w]hen a 
State opts to act in a field where its action has significant discretionary elements, it must 
nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the Constitution.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 
156, 168 (2012) (quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985)). This approach means 
that the Court intends to indirectly place plea bargaining into the constitutional criminal 
procedure rubric, like a right to appeal. Id. (“[C]riminal defendants have a right to effective 
assistance of counsel in direct appeals even though the Constitution does not require States 
to provide a system of appellate review at all.” (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985))). 
Given the increased importance of plea bargaining, injecting constitutional procedural rights 
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there are some barriers to cross for such claims. For a right to counsel to be 
effective, not only should public defense resources be substantially increased, 
but the IAC claim must also be properly asserted as intended, not as an 
anomaly.86 This is not an easy obstacle to overcome. Thus, up until now, it 
was unclear how recent changes of IAC jurisprudence would contribute to 
increasing the accuracy of guilty pleas. 
When cases are disposed of by guilty plea, the judicial standard for 
accepting the plea seems to be surprisingly low. With the emergence of 
numerous wrongful convictions after plea bargaining, the belief that an 
innocent person would not plead guilty is no longer certain. Although the 
IAC claim in a plea negotiation is now available, its utility is yet unknown. 
C.         The Limits of Existing Research 
Even though the Court’s expressed interest in plea bargaining is 
recent, many scholars have long explored this issue. Various studies—except 
for empirical studies with actual data—have been conducted from doctrinal, 
historical, 87  comparative, 88  economic, 89  and institutional 90  perspectives. 
These studies attempt to address the existing problems of plea bargaining and 
suggest a variety of ways to improve it. The studies classify the individual 
actors of the judicial system into three categories and proffer remedies for 
each: (1) prosecutor—limiting his discretion (power) to balance the playing 
field; (2) judge—increasing his role to ensure justice served; and (3) defense 
counsel—emphasizing and supporting his role. 91  They could be used as 
guidelines for remedying the current inaccuracies of guilty-plea practice. 
However, while wide-ranging reforms are necessary (as extensive 
research implies), even small changes in plea bargaining could face strong 
resistance.92 This is because the American criminal system is already well 
                                                 
therein was predictable to some extent. 
86 BIBAS, supra note 82, at xvi (noting that constitutional rights of defendants are mostly used  
as mere bargaining chips).  
87 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 2.   
88 See, e.g., Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The  
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure,  
45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004); Turner, supra note 59. 
89 See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare, 73 
AM. ECON. REV. 749 (1983); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1988). 
90 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 24. 
91 This is simply because they are three main actors in the plea-bargaining process.  
92 See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
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adapted to the current practice. Given this status quo, identifying where and 
how to begin reforms is a difficult decision. That decision requires 
determining which reform will be the most realistic, efficient, and most 
importantly, powerful. With this critical view in mind, this Article briefly 
reviews existing studies in each of the three categories mentioned above. 
First, although limiting prosecutorial discretion appears desirable, it 
is not easy to implement this kind of proposal. In the United States, most 
elected district attorneys exercise wide prosecutorial discretion, based on the 
appearance of strong political support.93  Thus, their discretion is largely 
controlled by their political responsibilities, rather than established judiciary 
rules.94 In addition, America’s apparent preference for the principle of free 
markets supports prosecutors’ extensive discretion.95 This deeply entrenched 
ideological principle creates a reluctance to restrain prosecutors’ discretion 
to negotiate with defendants. 96  Accordingly, regulating or limiting their 
discretion possibly means imposing restrictions on American democracy and 
the free market economy. 
Moreover, regulating the prosecution’s discretion requires a very 
cautious approach, because the criminal justice system is intricately 
interconnected. As Frank J. Remington once noted, “an effort to eliminate or 
reduce discretion at one stage in the process where it is visible, such as in trial 
court sentencing, will create a risk that discretion will merely shift to another 
stage where its exercise is less visible, such as the charging and guilty plea 
stages.” 97  In a similar vein, if a prosecutor’s discretion is reduced, the 
discretion might move to an even more invisible, currently unforeseen, place. 
This shows that it is not easy to regulate the discretion of the prosecutor. 
Second, to guarantee the accuracy of a guilty plea, the idea of 
increasing the judicial role in plea negotiation has been widely discussed.98 
                                                 
93 See DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND 
LAISSEZ FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 16–17 (2016). 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. 
97 Frank J. Remington, The Decision to Charge, the Decision to Convict on a Plea of Guilty, 
and the Impact of Sentence Structure on Prosecution Practices, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY 73, 110 (Lloyd E. 
Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993). 
98 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976); Turner, supra note 59. 
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However, less attention has been paid to plea colloquy proceedings.99 This 
Article argues that reinforcing the judge’s role in plea colloquy bears a greater 
examination, not only because Rule 11(c)(1) of the FRCP and precedents 
explicitly prohibit judicial participation in plea negotiation,100 but primarily 
because increasing the judge’s role in plea negotiation is more difficult and 
unlikely than in plea colloquy. 
Some argue that increasing judicial participation in plea negotiation 
could reduce the abuse of prosecutorial discretion and improve accuracy and 
transparency.101 “While all of these concerns [about judicial participation] are 
valid,” plea bargaining based on harsh sentencing policy “might coerce an 
innocent defendant to plead guilty.”102 Thus, judicial involvement in plea 
negotiation should “promote accuracy and fairness in plea bargaining.”103 A 
valid point, yet it seems incompatible with plea-bargaining jurisprudence. 
Both democracy and free market ideology encourage parties to negotiate plea 
conditions with few constraints. 104  Furthermore, the deeply entrenched 
adversarial culture in America has no compunction in promoting agreements 
in both civil and criminal cases.105 In this context, plea bargaining is usually 
treated more or less as a contract based on both parties’ free will.106 This is 
                                                 
99 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1339 (defining “plea colloquy” as “[a]n 
open-court dialogue between the judge and a criminal defendant, [usually] just before the 
defendant enters a plea, to establish that the defendant understands the consequences of the 
plea”). 
100 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (1) (West 2017). Rule 11, in pertinent part, provides:  
           (c) PLEA AGREEMENT PROCEDURE. 
(1) In General. An attorney for the government and the defendant’s 
attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss 
and reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate in 
these discussions.  
Id. (emphasis added).   
101 See Turner, supra note 59, at 204. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 214. 
104 Infra note 106–12 and accompanying text. 
105 Gerard E. Lynch noted: 
While some special rules apply to criminal cases, in its essential structure 
a criminal case is nothing more than an ordinary lawsuit: the state, like a 
private party in a tort or contract action, is just one entity that may come 
before the court to present a claim for relief, and the defendant is nothing 
more or less than the party from whom that relief is sought.  
Lynch, supra note 31, at 1676–77 (emphasis added). 
106 See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 551. 
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the central problem with increasing judicial involvement in plea negotiations 
themselves. 
In contrast, reinforcing a judge’s role in a plea colloquy is relatively 
acceptable, since the proceeding is administered after the completion of plea 
negotiations. Judicial intervention in this stage does not restrict either party’s 
discretion to negotiate but partially restrains the scope and available methods 
of case disposal. Thus, this approach would be a more appropriate way to 
strengthen courts’ involvement in the guilty-plea process. Most judges 
usually focus on the defendant’s voluntary wavier of procedural rights in a 
plea colloquy,107 and are rarely concerned about the substance of the guilty 
plea.108 Although the reliability of a guilty plea has become increasingly 
important, there have been no overt changes to match that increase. 109 
Accordingly, increasing the judge’s role in the plea colloquy, particularly on 
the substance of the plea agreement, is worth examination as a potential 
solution.110 
Third, many scholars have consistently highlighted the importance of 
the defense counsel’s role in plea bargaining.111 Placing the defendant on 
equal footing with the state in plea bargaining is crucial in the adversarial 
setting; thus, the significance of effective assistance of counsel is obvious. 
Moreover, given the current status quo of insufficient counsel in criminal 
litigation,112  the importance of the defense counsel’s role in plea bargaining 
                                                 
107 See Part II.B. 
108 See Part II.B 
109 Turner, supra note 59, at 212 (“At present, the factual basis inquiry into the plea is often 
perfunctory.”). 
110 This issue is examined in detail in Part III.    
111 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2545–47 (2004). 
112 Professor Robert A. Kagan states that:  
Although most (not all) state legislatures have steadily increased 
appropriations for public defenders’ offices and assigned criminal defense 
counsel, these expenditures have not kept pace with the volume of criminal 
cases. . . . Numerous studies have concluded that public defenders, while 
hardworking and generally competent, are ‘terribly overburdened.’ . . . [A] 
New York City study . . . found that court-appointed defense lawyers filed 
written pretrial motions on procedural issues in only 11 percent 
nonhomicide felony cases, but even this exceeded the proportion of cases 
in which appointed defense lawyers visited the crime site (4 percent), 
interviewed witness (4 percent), and used experts to challenge the 
prosecution’s evidence (2 percent). 
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 94 (2001)  
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should already be emphasized. Yet this is not a realistic remedy, as resources 
for public defense are inevitably limited. Additionally, because of political 
resistance, strong skepticism exists regarding increased funding for public 
defenders.113  Thus, Professor Stephanos Bibas claims that it is a better idea 
to “set it aside.”114 Accordingly, an alternative solution should be found. 
II. A REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE: REINVIGORATING THE FACTUAL BASIS 
REQUIREMENT 
A.         The Factual Basis Requirement: Unnoticed Safeguard  
As noted, most of the existing suggestions for improving the current 
plea bargain system are somewhat infeasible. Strengthening the court’s role 
in plea colloquy is plausible, unless the courts continue to focus only on 
confirming procedural guarantees before accepting guilty pleas, rather than 
reviewing the substance of plea agreements.115 
The courts were not always indifferent to the reliability of plea 
bargaining. In 1966, the Supreme Court amended Rule 11 of the FRCP.116 
The amendment required a “factual basis” before cases were disposed of by 
guilty plea.117 It primarily intended to “impose a duty on the court” to satisfy 
itself that “there is a factual basis for the plea before entering judgment.”118 
The rule advisory committee’s note explains that this requirement would 
                                                 
(citation omitted).  
113 Bibas, supra note 82, at 1070. 
114 Id. 
115  The Court is primarily concerned with the defendant’s voluntariness of plea, 
understanding of charge, understanding of possible consequences, and understanding of the 
rights waived, because they are directly relevant to the defendant’s constitutional rights. See 
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 21, at 1248–55. 
116 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
117 In Brady, the Court stated in dicta: 
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or with the consent of the court, 
nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall 
not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing 
the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily 
with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the 
plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea 
of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter 
a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of 
guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea. 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 744 n.3 (1970). 
118 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
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protect a defendant who pleads guilty voluntarily, “with an understanding of 
the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not 
actually fall within the charge.”119 The note further elucidates that the court 
should confirm that “the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the 
offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense included 
therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.”120 This change subjected 
guilty pleas to “considerable scrutiny,” and it was one of many attempts by 
the Warren Court to extend individual rights.121 The Court noted that the 
amended Rule 11 intended to provide “greater guidance to trial judges.”122 
This rule remains almost the same today.123 
After a few years of revision, the Court showed its willingness to 
strictly enforce the new Rule 11 in McCarthy v. United States. 124  The 
McCarthy Court emphasized the importance of the factual basis requirement 
by noting that, “because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a 
formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant 
                                                 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 See Terry L. Elling, Guilty Plea Inquiries: Do We Care Too Much?, 134 MIL. L. REV. 
195, 211 (1991). 
122 Id. at 212.   
123 The current Rule 11, in the pertinent part, provides:  
(b) CONSIDERING AND ACCEPTING A GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE 
PLEA. 
(1) Advising and Questioning the Defendant. Before the 
court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the 
defendant may be placed under oath, and the court must 
address the defendant personally in open court. During 
this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and 
determine that the defendant understands, the following: 
. . . 
(2) Ensuring That a Plea Is Voluntary. Before accepting 
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must 
address the defendant personally in open court and 
determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result 
from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in 
a plea agreement). 
(3) Determining the Factual Basis for a Plea. Before 
entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must 
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). 
124 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). 
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possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.”125 The Court 
subsequently quoted the Rule 11 Advisory Committee’s note to explain what 
the factual basis requirement intended to protect and what judges should do 
when determining factual basis.126 Although the primary issue in McCarthy 
concerned the judge’s personal inquiry in to whether the defendant 
understood the nature of the charge,127 the Court also mandated that a judge 
should “scrupulously” follow Rule 11, including the factual basis 
requirement.128 
Subsequently, the Burger Court reduced the importance of the factual 
basis requirement.129 In North Carolina v. Alford,130 the Court admitted a 
new kind of guilty plea, which continues to be a controversial subject.131 The 
Court held that “[a]n individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, 
and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he 
is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the 
crime.”132 Despite the fact that the defendant was in fact denying the crime, 
the Court did not require the judge to scrutinize a plea agreement more 
thoroughly. Professor Albert W. Alschuler noted that the Court made “the 
requirement of a factual basis . . . relatively unimportant,” because the Court 
“did not specify what kind of hearing a trial court must conduct before 
accepting [an Alford] plea . . . .”133 Absent a mandatory hearing, Alschuler 
was concerned that most guilty pleas would be accepted, simply because 
some evidence gathered during investigation could easily meet the factual 
basis requirement.134 
This conclusion needs to be examined further: the Alford Court did 
not necessarily send a signal. 135  In Alford, the petitioner pled guilty but 
                                                 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 467 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment).  
127 Id. at 463. 
128 Id. at 471. 
129 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE 
L.J. 1179, 1292–93 (1975); Steven Schmidt, Note, The Need for Review: Allowing 
Defendants to Appeal the Factual Basis of a Conviction After Pleading Guilty, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 284, 288–90 (2010). 
130 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
131 Id. at 37. 
132 Id. 
133 Alschuler, supra note 129, at 1292. 
134 Id. 
135 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 21, at 1257 (“The [Alford] Court did not state just how 
strong this factual basis must be, but it would appear that when a pleading defendant denies 
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claimed his innocence during plea colloquy in order to avoid a death 
penalty. 136  The Court did not reject this practice, because “an express 
admission of guilt . . . is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of 
criminal penalty.”137 However, the Court emphasized that the validity of an 
Alford guilty plea “cannot be seriously questioned,”138 because the strong 
evidence of actual guilt in the record “substantially negated [the defendant’s] 
claim of innocence.”139 It is possible that the jurisprudence of the Alford 
Court is largely attributable to the sufficient evidence in the plea records. In 
other words, if there had been no strong evidence in the record, it is doubtful 
that the Court would have held the plea constitutional. Although the holding 
did not specify an evidentiary hearing, the Court also noted that “the 
Constitution is concerned with the practical consequences” of a guilty 
plea. 140  Accordingly, it is arbitrary to conclude that Alford altered the 
importance of factual basis. Instead, the Court provided states with discretion 
to accept another form of guilty plea.141 
Because of this confused history, the factual basis requirement has 
received less attention than it should have. This even may have caused 
extreme inconsistencies in interpreting the factual basis requirement among 
courts. Professor Jenia I. Turner carefully researched this point by analyzing 
federal cases and interviewing legal officials.142 She noted: 
One court has defined the [factual basis requirement] as 
“sufficient evidence at the time of the plea upon which the 
court may reasonably determine that the defendant likely 
committed the offense.” Others have simply required “some 
factual basis.” Mere admissions of guilt by the defendant are 
often sufficient to support a guilty plea. Many courts have 
allowed judges to read the indictment to the defendant and 
then merely to inquire whether he committed the acts in 
                                                 
the crime the factual basis must be significantly more certain than will suffice in other 
circumstances.” (emphasis added)). 
136 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 (1970).  
137 Id. at 37. 
138 Id. at 38. 
139 Uncommonly, “[b]efore the plea was finally accepted by the trial court, the court heard 
the sworn testimony of a police officer who summarized the State’s case. Two other 
witnesses besides Alford were also heard.” Id. at 28. 
140 Id. at 37 (emphasis added). 
141 See Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[The courts] view an Alford 
plea as nothing more than a variation of an ordinary guilty plea.”).   
142 Turner, supra note 59, at 212–13. 
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question. In other courts, the prosecutor's summary of the 
evidence or submission of a probable cause affidavit is 
enough.143 
An astonishing variety of interpretation and application of the factual 
basis requirement exists among the federal courts. It seems that each court or 
individual judge has its own way. It is not clear whether this is an area where 
great flexibility or discretion is particularly required. Instead, it is more 
appropriate to note that the Warren Court reform has not been realized as 
intended. Particularly noteworthy is that, in some courts, either mere 
admission or a probable cause affidavit is sufficient to meet the factual basis 
requirement.144 If so, these courts have added nothing after the 1966 revision 
of Rule 11 of the FRCP. Thus, some have asserted that, in the American 
judicial system, a factual basis requirement is “relatively unimportant”145 and 
“more form than substance.”146 
The status quo in state courts appears to differ little from the federal 
courts. One Indiana trial judge, Earl G. Penrod, surveyed 50 judges (receiving 
responses from 36) to learn how Indiana trial court judges understand and 
establish the factual basis requirement in plea cases.147 Penrod noted that, 
even among the judges, there was no consensus about what “factual basis” 
meant.148 He also found that judges used a variety of methods in handling the 
factual basis requirement.149 Penrod concluded that trial judges inconsistently 
applied the factual basis requirement and failed to protect defendants’ rights 
in the interests of efficiency.150 As a result, he asserted that, “[a]lthough a 
                                                 
143 Id. 
144 Id. (citation omitted). 
145 Alschuler, supra note 129, at 1293. 
146 Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining 
Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 930 (1980). 
147 See Earl G. Penrod, The Guilty Plea Process in Indiana: A Proposal to Strengthen the 
Diminishing Factual Basis Requirement, 34 IND. L. REV. 1127 (2001). 
148 Id. at 1139–42.  
149 Penrod states that: 
Seven judges indicated that the factual basis process is conducted 
primarily by the judge, fourteen respondents indicated that the factual basis 
procedure is conducted primarily by the prosecutor, seven judges reported 
that the factual basis is primarily established by the defense attorney, and 
eight respondents advised that the factual basis resulted primarily from the 
combined efforts of the judge and the prosecutor. 
Id. at 1138. 
150 See id. at 1138–43. 
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simple, ‘Did you do it?’ may be a bit unrefined, a straightforward inquiry and 
an unqualified affirmative response must be part of the record.”151 
Faced with these problems, some legal scholars have pointed out the 
need to reinvigorate the factual basis requirement in guilty pleas. 
Strengthening judicial control in plea colloquy, to prevent weak cases from 
being disposed of by guilty plea, is a possible solution.152 Maximo Langer 
suggests that the standard of proof in meeting the factual basis requirement 
in plea colloquy should be “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that the 
prosecutor should present a sworn affidavit containing a summary of the 
evidence to convince the judge.153 Similarly, William J. Stuntz argues that a 
judge should carefully review the factual basis during plea colloquy, giving 
little deference to a prosecutor’s case.154 As an example, Stuntz cites the 
military court’s practice, which meticulously reviews the factual basis in a 
record.155 Both ideas may help guarantee an accurate guilty plea. However, 
as both of these ideas are only small parts of Langer’s and Stuntz’s broad 
studies, neither author gave any detailed explanation on how to achieve these 
goals.156 
B.         Ways to Reinvigorate the Factual Basis Requirement 
The current disregard of the factual basis requirement is problematic 
because the requirement is the only opportunity for substantial judicial review 
before the case is disposed of. Given the questionable accuracy of guilty pleas, 
                                                 
151 See id. at 1150. 
152 Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial 
Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 276–77 (2006). 
153 Id. 
154 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 302–03 (2011). 
155 Id. at 302–03. He states that:  
Military courts (along with a few state appellate courts) offer a useful 
model: they review the factual basis of guilty pleas with great care, and 
with little deference to the pleas themselves. That should be the norm 
everywhere. Stringent appellate review, with reversal in cases of what the 
military calls improvident pleas, would amount to a procedural tax on 
pleas. Tax anything and one is likely to see less of it. Plus, military-style 
review of guilty pleas would make the pleas that remain more accurate—
a large social gain. Such review would also shift power from prosecutors 
to judges, another social gain.  
Id. (citation omitted).  
156 Langer addresses this topic in only one page of his 77-page article. See Langer, supra note 
152, at 276–77. Stuntz also discusses the issue in only one short paragraph in his 413-page 
posthumous book. STUNTZ, supra note 154.  
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it is difficult to maintain the present perfunctory practice. Reinvigorating the 
factual basis requirement will increase the reliability of guilty pleas by 
pushing the judge to closely examine the substance of cases. 
However, there is an overlooked problem in the process of 
establishing the factual basis of guilty pleas. This problem is hidden away in 
the 1966 rule advisory committee note, which explains the amended FRCP 
Rule 11. The relevant note says that, when determining the factual basis, 
“[t]he court should satisfy itself . . . that the conduct which the defendant 
admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an 
offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.” 157 
Simply put, the rule states that the court should satisfy itself whether the 
defendant’s admitted conduct constitutes the charged offense or not. This 
requirement appears to be quite clear and thus could be expected to ensure 
the accuracy of a guilty plea: however, this is not the case. 
To understand why, we need to first analyze formalism—the legal 
reasoning theory that prevailed from the 1870s to the 1920s in the United 
States.158 Formalism considers a judge’s role as “simply locating the correct 
preexisting rule and applying it to the fact.”159 This legal reasoning assumes 
that “the law is rationally determinate,” and “adjudication is thus autonomous 
from other kinds of reasoning.”160  Therefore, the syllogistic reasoning in 
formalism can be expressed as follows: “The figure of its reasoning is the 
stating of a rule to certain facts, a finding that the facts of the particular case 
are those certain facts and the application of the rules a logical necessity.”161 
This is based on traditional syllogism (major premise, minor premise, and 
conclusion).162 Through this reasoning, formalists usually argue that all cases 
could come to only one conclusion. Although this is still an important part of 
                                                 
157 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
158 Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?, 6 (Univ. Chi. Pub. 
L. & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 320, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1646110. 
159 See Jack L. Landau, Logic for Lawyers, 13 PAC. L.J. 59, 65 (1981). 
160 Leiter, supra note 158, at 1 (quotation marks omitted). 
161  Landau, supra note 159 (emphasis added) (quoting John M. Zane, German Legal 
Philosophy, 16 MICH. L. REV. 287, 338 (1918)). 
162 Id. 67–68. 
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judicial reasoning today,163  few judges are exclusively dependent on this 
reasoning.164 
Interestingly, the paraphrased text of the 1966 advisory committee 
note and the legal reasoning process in formalism are very similar. Below are 
comparisons of each corresponding element between the note and formalistic 
reasoning. 
1966 Advisory Committee Note Formalistic Reasoning 
“the charged offense”165 “the stating of a rule to certain facts”166 
“the defendant’s admitted conduct”167 “a finding that the facts of the particular 
case are those certain facts”168 
“The court should satisfy itself . . . to 
constitute”169 
“the application of the rule[] [is] a 
logical necessity”170 
The first row of the 1966 Advisory Committee Note, “the charged offense,” 
matches with the first row of the formalistic reasoning, “the stating of a rule 
to certain facts.” They both address the applicable rule of each case, which 
would be the major premise in syllogism. The second row of the Note, “the 
defendant’s admitted conduct,” is very similar to the second row of the 
formalistic reasoning, “a finding that the facts of the particular case are those 
certain facts.”171  They deal with the facts of each case, which could be 
characterized as the minor premise in the syllogism. The third row of the Note, 
“The court should satisfy itself . . . to constitute,”172 is also analogous to the 
third row of reasoning, “the application of the rule[] [is] a logical 
necessity.”173 Both of these are the conclusions in each case. It is not clear 
whether FRCP Rule 11 is in fact promulgated based on this logic. It is fair to 
                                                 
163 See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 583, 585–91 (1993) (discussing formalism as “a theory of legal justification”).  
164  RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 108 (2013) (“There is no uniform 
approach. . . . Most federal court of appeals judge’s cluster in the central portion of the 
spectrum, with some leaning toward formalism and others toward realism, but none, or very 
few, being all one thing or all the other. Indeed, realism includes formalism as a special 
case—formalism is the realistic approach to many cases.”). 
165 Supra note 137 (paraphrasing the original text). 
166 Landau, supra note 159. 
167  Supra note 137 (paraphrasing the original text). 
168 Landau, supra note 159. 
169 Supra note 137 (paraphrasing the original text). 
170 Landau, supra note 159. 
171 Id. 
172 Supra note 137 (paraphrasing the original text). 
173 Landau, supra note 159.  
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say, however, that when a judge looks for the factual basis requirement, he 
or she is generally following formalistic legal reasoning. 
The application of formalism here, however, makes the process of 
finding a factual basis virtually meaningless. This is not to say formalism 
itself is a problem. 174  Instead, formalism may not work properly in an 
environment like a plea colloquy. The first two processes of formalistic legal 
reasoning, “the stating of a rule applicable to certain facts” and “a finding that 
the facts of the particular case,” require a judge's active recognition and 
interpretation.175 Thus, these processes should involve actively going back 
and forth between laws and facts. However, in a plea colloquy, this process 
may be transformed into the cursory syllogistic process, because pleading 
guilty is presumed to include both the defendant’s voluntary admission to his 
conduct (i.e., “a finding that the facts of the particular case”) and charged 
offense (i.e., “the stating of a rule applicable to certain facts”). 176  This 
admission is likely to oversimplify the formalistic reasoning process, because 
the judge would rely on the defendant’s admissions and omit his own active 
recognition and interpretation process. More likely than not, many judges 
would not struggle to deviate from this shortcut and may not feel the need for 
additional argument. Thus, the factual basis requirement is doomed to be 
structurally neglected. 
This problem requires a different approach. The 1966 advisory note 
says “[t]he court should satisfy itself . . . that the conduct which the defendant 
admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an 
offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.”177 In the 
Oxford Dictionaries, the definition of “satisfy” is to “[p]rovide (someone) 
with adequate information or proof so that they are convinced about 
something.”178 If this definition is applied to construe the Note, then a judge 
                                                 
174 For criticism of formalism, see Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988). 
175 See Leiter, supra note 158, at 2 (“[Formalistic] legal reasoning is not mechanical, that it 
demands the identification of valid sources of law, the interpretation of those sources, the 
distinguishing of sources that are relevant and irrelevant, and so on, and they offer a 
theoretical account of how these various bits of reasoning are done ‘rightly.’” (emphasis 
added)). 
176 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Central to the plea and the foundation 
for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant’s admission in open court that 
he committed the acts charged in the indictment.”). 
177 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (emphasis added). 
178 Satisfy, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition 
/american_ english/satisfy (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). Of the five meanings of “satisfy”  
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must provide himself with adequate information or proof, so that he is 
convinced to the standard criticized above. 
In interpreting the 1966 Advisory Note, if one put an emphasis on the 
word proof, it would no longer allow the judge to rely on the above cursory 
syllogistic process. This approach may induce judges to establish the factual 
basis requirement under the standard of proof rubric, which will lead judges 
to assume a greater responsibility in plea colloquy. 179  Instead of simply 
relying on the defendant’s voluntary admission, the judge must personally 
find the rule of “the charged offense” and the fact of “the defendant’s 
admitted conduct.”180  Formalistic legal reasoning would then work more 
properly. 
Given that standards of proof in charging decisions and in prior 
judicial proceedings are rather perfunctory,181 the standard of proof for the 
factual basis requirement should be at least “preponderance of evidence,”182 
or preferably “clear and convincing evidence.”183 This suggestion needs no 
revision of Rule 11 of the FRCP; a new interpretation is all that is needed. 
Interestingly, some courts have already adopted this approach. In an earlier 
case, after the revision of Rule 11, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit recognized that the factual basis requirement could be used as 
guidance for judges to find the probability of conviction for a guilty plea.184 
Other state courts have similarly noted that the factual basis requirement is 
                                                 
included, this one is the most analogous to the usage in the advisory note.  
179 See Note, The Trial Judge’s Satisfaction as to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966 
WASH. U. L. Q. 306, 320 (1966) (finding a factual basis, “[i]f no specific burden is 
established, the amount of evidence needed will be dependent upon the diligence of the trial 
judge”). 
180 See supra note 169–74 & accompanying text.  
181 See Part II.B. 
182  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1373 (defining “preponderance of 
evidence” as “[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater 
number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force” 
or “superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all 
reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue 
rather than the other”).  
183 Id. at 674 (defining “clear and convincing evidence” as “[e]vidence indicating that the 
thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain”). 
184 The court noted that the factual basis requirement in Rule 11, Fed. R. Crim. P. is 
“consistent with a probability-of-guilt standard, . . . [t]he committee’s purpose was that the 
court itself be satisfied of the factual basis for the plea, rather than rely exclusively on 
defendant and his counsel.” Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1967).  
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met when the record contains “enough that the court may say with confidence 
the prosecution could prove the accused guilty of the crime charged.”185 
It might be argued that no standard of proof really functions properly, 
given the inherent ambiguity in interpreting each standard. 186  Empirical 
studies have shown the lay persons’ inconsistency in applying the standard 
of proof.187 Although these results are not directly applicable to professional 
judges, it is not clear whether the newly established standard will make much 
difference. However, from pretrial proceeding to post-conviction relief, 
judicial proceedings inevitably rely on a judge’s decisions, based on 
numerous standards of proof.188 Accordingly, a primary concern should not 
be the ambiguity of any standards, but rather the absence of a standard of 
review in guilty pleas. At the very least, this Article’s suggestion would 
prevent those cases that only meet a “probable cause” (or merely a “beyond 
a reasonable suspicion”) standard. 
The idea of reinvigorating the factual basis requirement has several 
additional benefits. First, changes initiated by judicial officers are more 
realistic. As noted, existing proposals to regulate prosecutors or to increase 
defense resources face virtually insurmountable obstacles.189 In contrast, the 
judiciary is relatively well positioned to lead changes, considering its 
professional knowledge and political support. This judicial-based suggestion 
may not be the most desirable option, but it could be feasible enough to break 
up the standoff in guilty pleas. 
In addition, the increased responsibility for a judge to find a factual 
basis could positively impact prosecution. Prosecutors often do not carefully 
develop case files because of the expectation of reaching a plea agreement.190 
Even in weak cases, many defendants plead guilty, as almost all cases are 
disposed of by guilty pleas.191 Thus, current practices still involve the risk of 
                                                 
185 Jones v. State, 936 So.2d 993, 999 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Corley v. State, 585  
So. 2d 765, 767 (Miss. 1991)).  
186 See SIMON, supra note 63, at 195–97. 
187 See Id. at 195–96 (discussing empirical research about lay persons’ understanding of the 
standard of proof). 
188 For instance, the “probable cause” standard is used during preliminary hearings, and 
various standards are also used at the appellate level. 
189 See supra note 130–31 and accompanying text. 
190 See Part IV.B. 
191 Many scholars have discussed the problem of plea bargaining a case with weak evidence. 
See, e.g., Jenia I. Turner, Prosecutors and Bargaining in Weak Cases, in THE PROSECUTOR 
IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 102, 102–06 (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2012). 
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convicting innocents.192 Reinvigorating the factual basis requirement will 
induce prosecutors to develop the weaker cases to meet the specific standard 
of proof for pleas.193 By doing this, prosecutors would have stronger case 
files or could discover previously unknown exculpatory evidence. Both are 
good results and strengthen the dependability and accuracy of the system. 
Likewise, strengthening the factual basis requirement will bring a 
positive effect to present pre-plea discovery practice. In some jurisdictions, 
the scope of pre-plea discovery is very narrow 194  because, as Professor 
Turner noted, “the Supreme Court has never held that the prosecution’s 
evidence must be disclosed to the defendant before a guilty plea.”195 However, 
if the judge has a new obligation, this narrow practice could be changed. With 
an increased responsibility to find factual basis, judges will want to see more 
evidence prior to plea colloquy, and prosecutors will be obliged to disclose 
more evidence. These increased responsibilities of both judge and prosecutor 
will extend the scope of discovery before plea colloquy. This Article’s 
suggestion would lead to broad discovery (ideally open file discovery),196 
which would help participants in criminal proceedings make more informed 
decisions.197 
C.        How It Would Work 
However, even if the necessity and premise for strengthening the 
factual basis requirement is recognized, a smooth transition is not guaranteed. 
                                                 
192 Id. at 105.  
193 Of course, the resource problem also applies to the prosecution. Part IV.B addresses this 
issue in detail. 
194 See Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal 
Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 313–16 (discussing the pre-
plea discovery practice between an “open-file” model (North Carolina) and a “closed-file” 
model (Virginia)). 
195 Id. at 287 (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–32 (2002)) (emphasis added). 
196 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, 1263 (defining “open-file discovery” as “[a] 
case-specific policy in which prosecutors allow defense counsel to see (but not always to 
obtain copies of) all the documents in their file relating to the defendant”).  
197 Some criminal justice officials are still skeptical about open file policy because they 
consider that the Brady rule is sufficient to protect defendants’ rights. See Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 86(1963) (noting that prosecutors have to disclose exculpatory and impeach-
ment evidence before trial). They also note that, in practice, broader discovery than required 
by law is already provided by many prosecutors. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 194. 
However, Professor Jenia I. Turner, in her study of comparing open file practice (North 
Carolina) with closed file discovery practice (Virginia), empirically shows that the former 
actually provides more material and exculpatory evidence to defendants and makes the guilty 
plea process more efficient. See id. 
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American lawyers are already accustomed to the present guilty-plea practice 
and may not be familiar with placing the additional burden on the judge in a 
plea-colloquy stage. 198  Moreover, “[m]any judges seem to believe that 
prosecutors know more about specific cases than they do,” and thus “exercise 
a ‘light touch’ when it comes to their oversight of guilty pleas.”199 They 
simply note that there is not much evidence presented during plea colloquy.200 
It is thus necessary to overcome these conventions for this proposal’s 
potential to be realized, and steps must be taken to guide this process. 
First, the appropriate role of the judge in plea colloquy should be 
clarified. In jury trials, a judge acts as a gate keeper who addresses evidentiary 
matters; the judge’s important role is to decide the appropriate evidentiary 
issues to protect the jury from developing biases or prejudice.201 However, a 
plea colloquy is somewhat different from a jury trial. In a plea-colloquy 
proceeding, judges are obligated to find a factual basis before accepting a 
guilty plea; here, the judge operates as a fact-finder.202 If a judge fails to reach 
a certain standard of proof in forming a factual basis—after a thorough review 
of materials and hearing statements—the judge can also directly request 
additional information. A plea judge does not need to remain passive. Like 
the judges’ role in either a detention hearing 203  or a warrant judgment 
proceeding, where judges are expected to lead the proceeding and give a 
decision based on a clear standard, in plea hearings, judges can and should 
play a more important role. 
Critics may point out that even active judges are not well-equipped to 
find a concrete factual basis in plea colloquy. This view is based on a 
traditional belief that facts are mostly found in trial, where most of the 
evidence is presented.204 Appellate courts’ “extreme deference” to trial courts’ 
fact finding is based on this conventional belief. American lawyers assume 
that the fact-finding ability of appellate courts is significantly limited, 
                                                 
198 See Part IV.A. 
199 Richard L. Lippke, Reforming Plea Bargaining, in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 173, 177 (Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins eds., 2016). 
200 See id. 
201 FED. R. EVID. 103(c); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) 
(establishing the “gatekeeping role for the judge”). 
202 See Part III.A. 
203 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 836 (defining “detention hearing” as “[a] 
hearing to determine whether an accused should be released pending trial”).  
204  Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591, 
619 (2009). 
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because not much evidence is presented.205 However, this Article’s proposal 
could extend the scope of the evidence presented before or during the plea 
colloquy. This is because greater responsibilities on the judge and the 
prosecutor are expected to broaden the range of pre-plea discovery.206 
Even without this change, judicial fact finding in plea colloquy is not 
necessarily impossible. A plea-colloquy stage is still open to minimum fact 
finding, as appellate courts reviewing “cold record”207 also have some leeway. 
The institutional competence of appellate courts in fact finding is due to a 
number of factors:208 (1) the advantages of carefully reviewing a transcript; 
(2) the absence of misleading witness demeanor; (3) the advantage of 
professional judges’ experience; and (4) the equal condition in reviewing 
circumstantial and documentary evidence with the trial court.209 Simply put, 
the appellate courts have their own means of finding facts. Plea judges could 
enjoy all or some of those means. 
Plea judges can find facts by thoroughly reviewing materials, 
including plea agreements, complaints, and police reports.210 Although these 
materials might not be as substantial or comprehensive as a trial transcript, 
they nonetheless convey the minimum “logical and abstract operations.”211 
Plea judges are usually not at risk of being misled by the demeanor of 
witnesses and could use discretion in plea colloquy.212 If circumstantial and 
documentary evidence are presented, judges are on an equal footing with any 
fact finders. Moreover, there are no barriers for active judges to ask additional 
questions or to require the prosecution to submit other evidence if some 
doubts still exist. 213  Overall, it is entirely possible to have fact-finding 
activity during a plea colloquy. 
This Article’s proposal would induce the judge to undertake a more 
active role, deviating from the currently passive practice—meaningless 
                                                 
205 Id. at 602. Professor Chad M. Oldfather simply noted that fact finders in trial “can assess 
not only what a witness says, but also how she says it.” Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, 
Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 445 (2004). 
206 See infra note 234–37 and accompanying text.  
207  This phrase means “the transcripts of testimony and the documentary and physical 
exhibits introduced at trial.” Findley, supra note 204, at 619. 
208 Oldfather, supra note 205, at 449–50. 
209 Id. at 451–66. 
210 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). 
211 Oldfather, supra note 205, at 456. 
212 See infra note 250–52 & accompanying text. 
213 No rule in FRCP prohibits this kind of request from the judge.  
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formalistic syllogism. For instance, a judge would adhere to the following 
steps to satisfy his reinvigorated responsibility: (1) before entering the 
courtroom, the judge would thoroughly read the relevant materials, including 
a complaint and a police report, to identify facts and issues of the case (in the 
present stage, the judge may enter the courtroom without thorough 
knowledge); (2) the judge would hear more detailed facts of the case from 
the prosecutor, defense attorney, and defendant (at present, the judge is not 
obligated to listen to the specific facts other than the guilty plea); (3) the judge 
would require a brief description of the type and content of evidence held by 
the prosecutor214 (at present, the judge does not need to review all of the 
evidence that the prosecution has); (4) the judge would ask for more detailed 
information of evidence, if he or she is still not satisfied with the standard of 
proof (this rarely occurs today); (5) the judge would require the prosecution 
to submit the additional evidence (again, at present, this rarely occurs); (6) 
the judge would request the sentencing report, postponing the acceptance of 
guilty plea (once again, this rarely occurs).215 
The stages illustrated above are all things that a judge could do in plea 
colloquy. Indeed, there would no obligation for the judge to meet all the steps, 
if only some prove sufficient in a given case. Depending on different 
situations, the judge will selectively act to meet the burden of proof. As the 
proposed burden of proof (preponderance of evidence or clear and convincing 
evidence) in this Article is not overly high, significant changes to practice are 
not expected. 
The following reforms would support an establishment of the factual 
basis requirement. First, preparing a plea agreement should involve more 
sophisticated practice than most states currently require. In this regard, a 
comparison of federal and state plea agreements provides some insights. 
Federal prosecution produces a lengthy document containing comprehensive 
rules and consequences of accepting a plea agreement.216 It usually includes 
                                                 
214 This situation is similar with Professor Maximo Langer’s suggestion. See Langer, supra 
note 152, at 276–77. 
215 This is already available under the current rule of criminal procedure. “To the extent the 
plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept the 
agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.” 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (3)(A). 
216 Plea Agreement, U. S. DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVES, https://www.justice.gov/ag/plea-agreeme 
nt (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) (displaying a plea agreement form used in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia). 
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detailed fact patterns in guilty pleas: states use less elaborate practices.217 For 
instance, Wisconsin prosecutors usually produce a short document that 
outlines a checklist to waive one’s constitutional rights.218 The process is 
often improvised with defendants sitting outside a courtroom, shortly before 
a plea colloquy. 219  Under this practice, it is questionable whether state 
prosecutors critically review police reports and other evidence to convey 
factual basis. The judge’s critical review of the factual basis requirement is 
just as limited. The best practice, similar to the federal practice, would not 
only assist judges in finding a factual basis but would also force prosecutors 
to thoroughly examine their files. 
Second, there needs to be consistency in allowing appeals based on 
the lack of a factual basis. For example, some federal appellate courts allow 
appeals based on a lack of a factual basis after defendants plead guilty, but 
this is not always the case.220 Moreover, there is an inconsistency even within 
circuits in allowing defendants to appeal.221 Among the circuits that allow 
appeals under a less strict standard, the standard itself is not clear.222 Various 
standards, including “de novo,” “abuse of discretion,” “clearly erroneous,” 
and “plain error” standards, are used when appellate courts evaluate claims 
of an inadequate factual basis.223 These variances fail to protect a defendant 
to differing degrees, depending on the jurisdiction in which the defendant is 
charged. Strengthening the factual basis requirement will only become 
possible when these circuit splits are resolved. 
Reforming plea bargaining practice will take enormous effort. Given 
the predominance of plea bargaining in its current practice, even a small 
change could raise political, institutional, and cultural resistance.224 It is thus 
                                                 
217  See, e.g., State of Wisconsin, Circuit Court, Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights, 
WICOURTS.GOV, https://www.wicourts.gov/forms/CR-227.PDF (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) 
(displaying a plea agreement form used in the circuit court in the State of Wisconsin); Plea 
Agreement, ST. FLA., http://flcourts18.org/docs/sem/Felony_Plea_Agreement_1_06_SC18_ 
Rev.5-15-14-Eng.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). 
218 See State of Wisconsin, Circuit Court, Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights, 
WICOURTS.GOV, https://www. wicourts.gov/forms/CR-227.PDF (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) 
(displaying a plea agreement form used in the circuit court in the State of Wisconsin). 
219 This is the author’s own experience during judicial internship in Dane County Courthouse 
in Wisconsin. 
220 Schmidt, supra note 129, at 313–14. 
221 Id.  
222 Id. at 295–96. 
223 Id. 
224 Packer, supra note 36, at 47 (“It is widely asserted that any significant increase in the 
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important to review the resistances that these proposals might bring and 
address the concerns about them. 
III. REFUTING ANTICIPATED COUNTERARGUMENTS 
A.        Concerns for Inertia of Adversary Philosophy 
In the current state of affairs, lawyers are accustomed to the 
adversarial culture, and judges operate as neutral and passive fact-finders.225 
Even a slight or narrowed judicial intervention might prove to be impossible. 
Professor William T. Pizzi pointed out that this adversarial obsession arose 
from American lawyers’ misunderstanding of other countries’ legal systems 
and blind faith in the American legal system.226 “As practitioners, they may 
be quite excellent at what they do but as law reformers they are timid and 
unimaginative.”227 It might be difficult to overcome this established standard, 
even though the trial judges’ authority in plea colloquy is grounded in 
existing procedure. 
This deep inertia also shapes the direction of reforms in the legal 
system. Despite the Innocence Movement, the past three decades have 
witnessed only minimal change in the adversarial system. 228  Legal 
                                                 
number of criminal prosecutions going to trial would result in a breakdown of the criminal 
justice system.”). 
225 See Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 
OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 714–15 (1983). 
226 See WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS 
HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO REBUILD IT 90–91 
(1999). Professor Pizzi states that:  
When it comes to what I have been referring to in this book as 
“continental” or “European” countries, such as Germany, France, or the 
Netherlands, American lawyers know next to nothing. Sometimes what 
they think they “know” is worse than knowing nothing. You will 
occasionally hear leading members of the bar saying things about other 
western countries—for example, that “in country X the defendant is 
assumed guilty and must prove he is innocent” or that “in country Y the 
defendant is not given a trial”—which are untrue for those countries. The 
tone of such pronouncements usually implies that our trial system is clearly 
superior to any other, that our lawyers and judges have it all pretty much 
figured out, and that we have little to learn from other legal systems. 
Id. 
227 Id. at 91. Pizzi points out that American law schools’ inadequate education with respect 
to other countries’ legal systems makes creative reforms unimaginable. Id. 
228 See Marvin Zalman & Ralph Grunewald, Reinventing the Trial: The Innocence 
Revolution and Proposals to Modify the American Criminal Trial, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 189 
(2015). 
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scholarship has mainly focused on the specific causes of wrongful conviction 
(such as eyewitness misidentification, false confession, and jailhouse 
snitches), the legal profession (prosecutorial and police misconduct and 
ineffective assistance of counsel), and psychological effect of legal actors 
(e.g., tunnel vision).229 In contrast, scholarship that addresses the trial or 
pretrial processes has been “comparatively sparse.”230 The “adversary trial 
does not appear on any canonical list of wrongful conviction causes,”231 but 
“lawyers’ ideology may have blinded them from seeing the trial system itself 
as a source of error, or changing the adversary trial process may have seemed 
too theoretical and remote.”232 Not only are few judges willing to be more 
active in plea colloquy, but both parties could also be resistant to judicial 
intervention. 
The American adversarial culture views a neutral and passive fact 
finder as a symbol that should not be infringed. 233  Professor Stephan 
Landsman mentioned two understandable ideas underlying this preference. 
He first noted that an “[a]dversary theory suggests that if the decision maker 
strays from the passive role, he risks prematurely committing himself to one 
version of the facts and failing to appreciate the value of all the evidence.”234 
This suggests that the adversary theory finds that neutrality and passivity 
“convince society that the judicial system is trustworthy.”235 Similarly, Chief 
Justice John Roberts once revealed his judicial philosophy in his confirmation 
hearing by describing the role of a judge as limited to that of an umpire, 
calling balls and strikes, and not of a player, pitching or batting.236 
The primary concern is that many trial judges do not even perform 
their minimal roles as final arbiters. Incorporating Justice Roberts’ analogy, 
it is true that roles of baseball umpires are limited to calling balls and strikes. 
But they carefully observe the ball’s location with keen eyes and deliberately 
call balls or strikes during a game. However, it seems that plea judges do not 
even care so much about the ball’s location—about the substance of a case 
                                                 
229 Id. at 190–91. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 191. 
232 Id. at 192. 
233 See Landsman, supra note 225, at 715. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of  
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005). 
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and whether factual basis exists. Their eyes only follow the players to find 
out whether they properly follow the rules and wear protective equipment—
whether defendants appropriately waive their constitutional rights. This 
baseball analogy may exaggerate the similarities and differences between 
umpires and judges. Nevertheless, most plea judges arguably consider their 
roles as merely accepting mutual agreements on the condition that the process 
is appropriate. The American trial judge’s role as final arbiter has become 
extremely weak and passive. 
This deeply entrenched philosophy is the main barrier for this 
Article’s proposal to be realized. When there is no marked dispute between 
two parties, judges who are not familiar with the facts of the case may not 
know what actions to take. One who agrees with the baseball umpire analogy 
would still dislike more strengthened review for the factual basis in plea 
colloquy. However, the difficulty of realization does not mean that it is 
impossible. This proposal does not come from nowhere and in fact fits with 
existing scholarly efforts that seek to heighten the role of judges. The idea of 
judicial participation in plea negotiation is one of these existing efforts.237 
These efforts are also reflected in the urge to increase reviews of problematic 
evidence.238 The attempt to broaden factual review in the appellate process 
similarly demands a greater judicial role than the present process. 239 
Altogether, these efforts will help to overcome the inertia of legal 
professionals. Momentum generated by those reforms will pave the way for 
this Article’s proposal. 
The ways in which plea bargaining has been introduced in European 
countries provide some lessons to the American plea-bargaining system. At 
first, the introduction of plea bargaining in Europe faced serious criticism, 
because it contradicts the fundamental idea of the inquisitorial system: that 
the state should pursue the truth, not agreement.240 Conversely, European 
countries did not implement American-style plea bargaining; they modified 
                                                 
237 See Turner, supra note 59. 
238 See Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and 
Evidentiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723 (2013) (discussing judicial 
gatekeeping about suspect evidence). 
239  Findley, supra note 204, at 623 (“Appellate judges can then use that training—that 
acquired institutional advantage—to engage in more meaningful factual review of cases 
involving that kind of evidence.” (citing George C. Thomas III, Bigotry, Jury Failures, and 
the Supreme Court’s Feeble Response, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 947, 973 (2007))). 
240 See Langer, supra note 88, at 3–4. 
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the original plea bargaining to be compatible with their systems.241 Greater 
judicial control of plea bargaining in European countries helps remedy many 
of the problems in the American system.242  For example, the sentencing 
disparity between trial and guilty plea is less dramatic in Germany than in 
America.243 American legal professionals should recognize that there is no 
single, eternal plea-bargaining practice. As some already urge modifications 
of the American plea-bargaining system based on comparative study,244 it is 
worth considering taking a different angle, to move into at least a slightly 
different direction. 
B.        Concerns about Resources 
Strong concerns about resources are another tough obstacle to this 
Article’s proposal. Many legal professionals consistently raise this issue by 
noting the crowded dockets of trial courts and limited government 
personnel.245 In fact, this was the primary concern when the Supreme Court 
held that the Constitution does not require impeachment information to be 
disclosed to the defendant before the guilty-plea stage.246 In United States v. 
Ruiz,247 the Court expressly held that mandatory disclosure of impeachment 
evidence “could require the Government to devote substantially more 
                                                 
241 See Id. at 3 (“[T]he importation of plea bargaining into these jurisdictions is not likely to 
reproduce an American model of criminal procedure. Each of these jurisdictions has adopted 
a form of plea bargaining that contains differences—even substantial differences—from the 
American model, either because of decisions by the legal reformers in each jurisdiction or 
because of structural differences between American criminal procedure and the criminal 
procedures of the civil law tradition.”). 
242 Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, American Criminal Procedure in a European Context, 21 CARDOZO 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 453–54 (2013) (elaborating that in European countries, the “judicial 
monitoring guarantees the fairness of the deal and should avoid some of the problems related 
to U.S. plea bargaining; particularly, the lack of legal counsel and the pressure imposed by 
prosecutors so that the accused accepts the guilty plea”). 
243 Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American 
Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 354 
(1995) (“German practices appear less likely to cause major sentencing disparities, to 
encourage initial over-charging, or to create undue risks of convicting the innocent.”). 
244 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 191, at 115 (“[The German] system seem[s] to do a better 
job of avoiding plea bargains that are not based on the facts and impose unacceptable risks 
of coercing innocent defendants to plead guilty. . . . [It] may serve useful model for American 
reformers interested in curbing the dangers associated with plea bargaining in cases where 
the evidence is weak.”). 
245 See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 552. 
246 United States. v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629–32 (2002).  
247 Id. at 622. 
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resources to trial preparation prior to plea bargaining, thereby depriving the 
plea-bargaining process of its main resource-saving advantages.” 248 
Particularly, the Court noted that “the added burden imposed upon the 
Government by requiring its provision well in advance of trial (often before 
trial preparation begins) can be serious.”249 
This kind of concern is reasonable. Anyone who visits any county 
trial court for the first time would be surprised by its long list of plea-hearing 
cases scheduled in a single day; the time cycles of trial judges and prosecutors 
are frenetic. It is plausible to argue that this Article’s suggestion, to require a 
judge to be convinced beyond a certain burden of proof in finding a factual 
basis requirement, would disrupt the current balance of the plea-bargaining 
process. 
However, there is no reason to treat all cases the same. Exonerations 
often receive national headlines largely because they were felony offenses 
involving long-term incarcerations. Thus, as Professor Alexandra Natapoff 
noted, although wrongful convictions in misdemeanors are also 
problematic,250 it would not be unreasonable to focus first on felony cases. 
To handle felony cases more carefully is also justifiable from a constitutional 
perspective. The Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial for “serious” 
offenses,251 and a right to appointed counsel in limited cases.252 The same 
could apply to the factual basis requirement. California already does not 
require factual basis for a guilty plea to a misdemeanor offense.253 Similarly, 
the Supreme Court also flexibly responded to this factual basis requirement 
in the past. In Libretti v. United States, the Court held that a factual basis 
under Rule 11 of the FRCP is not necessarily required for a stipulated asset, 
because forfeiture is not part of a conviction.254 
                                                 
248 Id. at 632. 
249 Id. at 633. 
250 See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 
1059 (2015). 
251 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68–69 (1970) (“[N]o offense can be deemed ‘petty’ 
for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is 
authorized.”). 
252 E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (holding that the right to counsel 
applies to all cases where imprisonment is a possibility); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 339–40 (1963) (holding that the right to counsel applies to all criminal cases). 
253 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 2017). 
254 Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 38–39 (1995). However, this holding is at risk of 
reversal after Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because “Apprendi eschews the 
distinction between sentencing factors and elements of a crime.” United States v. Buckland, 
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There is, in fact, an existing way to confirm factual basis without 
consuming extra resources. The 1966 advisory note on Rule 11 gave 
additional leeway to establish factual basis “by examining the presentence 
report.”255 Using a presentence report in a guilty-plea process would not 
substantially increase the resource demand, because the report is already 
scheduled to be prepared for sentencing hearings. Reviewing them in plea 
colloquy just means consuming the investigation resource a few months 
earlier. In addition, judges are free to employ these materials because the 
Rules of Evidence are not applied during plea colloquy.256 
Lastly, strengthening a judge’s role in a guilty-plea process could also 
bring a positive change to legal culture and practice. It is well known that the 
preference for a jury trial is largely based on concerns of the overreaching 
power of the judicial branch.257 Thus, a judgment by peers, apparently more 
democratic, holds a dominant position in the American trial system; bench 
trials are relatively rare.258 If a trial judge shows his or her willingness to 
evaluate the substance of cases with a distinct suspicion, this would reduce 
prejudice against the judiciary and induce some defendants to choose a bench 
trial as an alternative. Bench trials are generally more informal and shorter, 
which saves judicial and prosecutorial resources, thus dealing with this major 
concern.259 
C.        Concerns for Losing Benefits for Defendants  
The third potential problem is that defendants could lose benefits if 
the courts more rigorously examine plea agreements and accept them only 
under more stringent standards. Indeed, defendants have enjoyed benefits 
because of plea bargaining, as the court now accepts plea agreements quickly 
and on a generous basis. The primary benefit is that defendants can avoid a 
                                                 
289 F.3d 558, 566 (9th Cir. 2002); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL RULES 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 174 (4th ed. 2017).  
255 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
256 See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 254. 
257 See Langbein, supra note 2, at 269 (“In America, where the judiciary’s association with 
the excess of English colonial administration had led the framers to make jury trial a 
constitutional right, bench trial was all the harder to envision.”). 
258 Id. at 269. 
259 Although it is possible to say that a jury trial is sometimes faster, and a bench trial takes 
more time to reach a decision, see  Prentice H. Marshall, A View from the Bench: Practical 
Perspectives on Juries, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 147, 156 (1990), few might argue that a bench 
trial in fact consumes more resources.  
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harsh sentence under the current severe punishment policies. 260  Even if 
defendants can assert innocence because the evidence from prosecution is 
weak, going to trial can be a dangerous gamble under the severe sentencing 
policies as they are now. Plea agreements also usually have much shorter 
sentences.261 In addition, some defendants, for various reasons, wish to be 
released earlier from criminal procedure by pleading guilty.262 By waiving a 
right to a public trial, they may avoid humiliation before known or unknown 
persons.263 Or they might wish to protect victims from being embarrassed if 
intimate relationships exist. Thus, the current plea-bargaining practice is part 
of a spontaneous output of current criminal justice policy and defendants’ 
interests. 
However, the introduction of more stringent judicial review of the 
factual basis does not mean that all the current benefits enjoyed by the 
defendant will disappear. One reason for imposing harsh punishment on 
defendants who do not plead guilty is that not-guilty pleas lead to the 
consumption of more government resources.264  In contrast, this proposal 
claims that it is the judge, not the defendant, who decides to go to trial when 
                                                 
260 See Lippke, supra note 199, at 175–78 (noting that “[t]he magnitude of the sentencing 
concessions” and “[t]he existence of trial penalties” are principle reasons of distinctive “trial 
avoidance” in America).  
261 See Id. at 175 (“Though estimates vary, it seems clear that such sentencing concessions 
can exceed 50 percent of the statutorily available sentence[.]”). 
262 See Id. at 177 (“[P]retrial detention, numerous required court hearings, delays in the onset 
of trials, the public embarrassment involved in having to appear and answer to charges, 
foregone earnings from work, and stress on familial and other social relations.”). 
263 See Id. 
264 See Id. at 176. Professor Lippke explains: 
Criminal defendants who refuse to enter guilty pleas, but who instead go 
to trial and are convicted, are very unlikely to receive the sentence or 
charge concessions on offer from prosecutors pretrial, assuming that 
prosecutors saw fit to offer any. Such concessions were proffered as 
rewards for guilty pleas. But do persons convicted after trials suffer more 
than the loss of such “waiver rewards”? Many observers believe that they 
do, that prosecutors often recommend longer sentences than they might 
have initially deemed appropriate or fair, given the nature of the 
accusations against persons, simply to punish the convicted for having 
exercised the right to trial. These vindictively-motivated sentence add-ons 
are “trial penalties.” Not only can they be substantial, but judges might 
also go along with them. Judges likewise do not appear to appreciate 
exercise of the right to trial by many criminal defendants. Assuming they 
exist, trial penalties swell sentencing differentials.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
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a prosecution’s file lacks an adequate factual basis. Therefore, at the 
sentencing hearing, the judge would not consider a trial as an aggravating 
sentencing factor. Thus, defendants would not need to fear a “trial 
penalty.”265 
Moreover, this Article does not argue that every case failing to meet 
a certain standard should be dismissed. This means that, if the evidence shows 
that defendants obviously receive benefits from a guilty plea, then the judge 
could be allowed to accept the guilty plea, whether in charge bargaining266 or 
sentence bargaining.267 Charge bargaining might involve a guilty plea to a 
day offense, even though the factual basis supports a night offense.268 If so, 
the judge would have a difficult time finding a factual basis when “the offense 
to which the plea is made is not a logical[ly] included offense of the crime 
committed.”269 Sentence bargaining might include a sudden decrease in the 
amounts of drugs that is seized and already tested in forensic laboratory. 
However, in those cases, defendants obviously benefit from plea bargaining. 
Only when there is a significant lack of factual basis as to raise a concern 
about convicting the innocent, should judges actively establish the factual 
basis and be deliberate in admitting guilty pleas. 
Yet even if all of the criticisms and concerns discussed are irrefutable 
and unresolvable, plea bargaining itself is not a constitutional right, unlike 
the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.270 In other words, 
rejecting a disposal by guilty plea will not itself harm the defendant from a 
constitutional perspective.271 
CONCLUSION 
Because the concern of wrongful guilty pleas has increased, the 
accuracy and reliability of plea agreements must be carefully addressed. 
Nonetheless, in practice, plea bargaining is now substantially being accepted 
                                                 
265 See Id. 
266BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1338 (defining a “charge bargain” as a “plea 
bargain” whereby a prosecutor agrees to drop some of the counts or reduce the charge to a 
less serious offense in exchange for a plea of either guilty or no contest from the defendant).  
267Id. at 1339 (defining a “sentence bargain” as an “agreement between a prosecutor and a 
defendant whereby the defendant stipulates that some facts are true in exchange for the 
prosecutor’s not introducing certain other facts into evidence”).  
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269 Id. 
270 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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under very low standards of proof. This Article addresses the issues of judges 
being unconcerned with or inconsistent in the practice of guiding the stages 
of guilty plea. The Article further suggests that a judge should carefully 
review the factual basis to avoid a wrongful guilty plea. Although Rule 11(b) 
of the FRCP requires judges to check the factual basis of guilty pleas, the rule 
is not given much attention by legal professionals. This shows that the rule 
itself has a structural problem, which causes judges to improperly enforce it 
during plea colloquy. Instead of revising the rule, this Article proposes a new 
interpretation, which will induce judges to confirm the factual bases for such 
pleas. This practical solution presents a number of advantages: (1) filtering 
out inaccurate and unreliable guilty pleas, (2) increasing the accountability of 
the prosecution in guilty pleas, and (3) helping defendants make more 
informed plea decisions. Some of the concerns associated with the proposal 
of this Article can be overcome (concerns for inertial of adversary 
philosophy 272 ), reasonably managed (concerns about resources 273 ), or 
understood that they are, in fact, rather exaggerated (concerns for losing 
profits of defendants274). This Article provides the blueprint for a new, better 
future for all those involved in plea bargaining in America. 
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